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1. Introduction 
The main goal of Karen Neander’s important book (2017) is to defend a particular version of 
teleosemantics, which holds that the norms necessary for the semantic evaluation of intentional 
mental states in cognitive science are grounded (at least in part) in the normal-proper functions 
of cognitive systems. The account aims to be naturalistic, explaining how intentionality is 
derived from non-intentional and non-semantic properties already recognized by the natural 
sciences. Its scope is restricted to low-level non-conceptual cognition, presuming – as is standard 
practice among naturalistic philosophers of cognition – that insight derived from studying simple 
cases will eventually help illuminate sophisticated human thought. The project is admirable in 
eschewing appeal to intuitions about toy cases, instead building a case on the basis of careful 
discussion of empirical work in cognitive science. My comments will focus on two central 
chapters – a general methodological argument for teleosemantics and a detailed discussion of 
prey-capture in the toad. I argue that while Neander’s work elucidating the toad case, in 
particular, is exemplary, she hasn’t succeeded in discovering what teleosemantics needs, namely, 
an explanatory role for the notion of normal-proper function in cognitive science.  
 
2. The Methodological Argument for Informational Teleosemantics 
 
In chapter 4 Neander offers a methodological argument for informational teleosemantics. It is 
intended to show that the view is supported by the explanations of cognition currently provided 
by cognitive science. Here is the argument: 
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P1        A notion of normal-proper function is central to the multilevel componential analyses 
(i.e. functional analyses) of the operation of bodies and brains that are currently provided 
by physiologists and neurophysiologists.  
P2        The brain’s normal-proper functions include cognitive functions. 
P3        The same notion of function (mentioned in P1) is central to the functional analyses of 
cognition that cognitive scientists provide. 
P4       An assumption in the mainstream branches of cognitive science is that cognition involves 
information processing. 
P5       The (relevant) notion of information involved in such talk of information processing in 
cognitive science is (not a semantically evaluable notion but instead) a notion of natural-
factive information. 
P6        Cognitive science posits “normative aboutness,” with the norms derived from the 
aforementioned normal-proper functions and the aboutness from the aforementioned 
natural-factive information. 
C         Informational teleosemantics is supported by the explanations of cognition that the mind 
and brain sciences currently provide.  
I shall challenge the argument at P3 and P6. 
 The notion of normal-proper function appealed to in P1 (and P2, P3, and P6), Neander 
argues (in chapter 3), is central to biology, and more specifically, to the analyses of bodily and 
brain processes provided by physiologists and neurophysiologists. The notion of N-P function 
has two important features: (i) it is the notion of function that underwrites talk of normal and 
abnormal functioning, as in, for example, talk of a normally functioning human immune system, 
and (ii) it supports a distinction between function and accident, which underwrites the idea that 
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an item is for something. Hearts, for example, are for pumping blood, not for making whooshing 
sounds, though they typically do both. Selected function – what an item was selected to do – is 
one species of normal-proper function, and it is this more specific notion that Neander in fact 
thinks plays a central role in both physiology and the cognitive sciences.  
 I think that feature (ii) – privileging one effect among the various things that an item 
typically does – presupposes some process of selection (typically by evolution in the case of 
biological systems, or by design in the case of artifacts). In any event, the methodological 
argument for teleosemantics appeals only to the more general notion of normal-proper function. I 
will challenge the claim (P3) that this notion plays a central role in cognitive science. 
 The branches of cognitive science at issue in the argument (see P4) are those that 
construe cognition as a species of information processing, in other words, computational 
cognitive psychology and computational neuroscience. The issue, then, is whether the notion of 
N-P function plays an explanatory role in these sciences. If we look at actual practice I think it is 
clear that it does not.1 Computational theorists aim to characterize the processes underlying 
cognition as a species of mathematical process. Observing that a physical system succeeds at 
some cognitive task – detecting significant boundaries in the scene, grasping nearby objects, 
understanding and producing speech, and so on – the theorist hypothesizes that the system 
computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this 
function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity 
that is the explanatory target of the theory.2 The strategy is pervasive in computational cognitive 
science; let me cite a few examples from various cognitive domains. Marr’s (1982) theory of 
 
1 See Egan 2014, 2017 for defense of the view described here.  
2 This mathematical sense of function is not to be confused with the various notions of function 
at issue in the present debate. 
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early vision purports to explain edge detection by positing the computation of the Laplacian of a 
Gaussian of the retinal array. The mechanism takes as input intensity values at points in the 
image and calculates the rate of intensity change over the image. In other words, it computes a 
particular smoothing function. Ullman (1979) hypothesizes that the visual system recovers the 
3D structure of moving objects by computing a function from three distinct views of four non-
coplanar points to the unique rigid configuration consistent with the points. Shadmehr and 
Wise’s (2005) computational account of motor control purports to explain how a subject is able 
to grasp an object in view by computing the displacement of the hand from its current location to 
the target location, i.e. by computing vector subtraction. In a well-known example from animal 
cognition, Gallistel (1990) purports to explain the Tunisian desert ant’s impressive navigational 
abilities by appeal to the computation of the displacement vector to its nest from any point along 
its foraging trajectory. Seung et al. (1996, 1998, 2000) hypothesize that the brain keeps track of 
eye movements by deploying an internal integrator. Theories employing the strategy explain a 
cognitive capacity by appeal to an independently well-understood mathematical function under 
which the physical system is subsumed. In other words, what gets computed, according to these 
computational models, is the value of a mathematical function (e.g., vector subtraction, the 
Laplacian of a Gaussian, a fast Fourier transform) for certain arguments for which the function is 
defined. A fully specified theory of a cognitive capacity will go on to propose an algorithm by 
which the computation of the value of the function(s) is effected, and describe the neural 
hardware that implements the computation.3 
 
3 The specification of the function computed, the specification of the algorithm, and the neural 
implementation correspond, roughly, to David Marr’s three levels of description—the 
computational, algorithmic, and implementation, respectively. The topmost, computational, level 
of theory also adverts to general environmental facts (‘constraints’) essential to the explanation 
of the cognitive capacity, as explained below. See Egan (1995) for elaboration and defense of 
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  The mathematical characterization provides a domain-general, environment-neutral 
characterization of a mechanism. It prescinds not only from the cognitive capacity that 
is the explanatory target of the theory (vision, motor control, etc.), but also from the 
environment in which the capacity is normally exercised. In fact, the abstract nature of 
the computational characterization—in particular, the fact that as an independently characterized 
mathematical object the function can be decoupled from both the environmental 
context and the cognitive domain that it subserves—accounts for an important explanatory virtue 
of computational characterization. The mathematical functions deployed in computational 
models are typically well understood independently of their use in such models. Laplacian of 
Gaussian filters, fast Fourier transforms, vector subtraction, and so on are standard items in the 
applied mathematician’s toolbox. To apply one of these tools to a biological system—to subsume 
the system under the mathematical description—makes sense of what might otherwise be a 
heterogeneous collection of input–output pairs. Since the computational characterization 
specifies the function intensionally, typically in terms of an algorithm for computing the 
function, it provides the basis for predicting the output of the device in a wide range of 
circumstances that go well beyond the observed data set. 
 Of course, the cognitive theorist must explain how computing the value of the 
specified function, in the subject’s normal environment, contributes to the exercise of 
the cognitive capacity that is the explanatory target of the theory. Only in some environments 
would computing the Laplacian of a Gaussian help an organism to see. In our environment this 
computation produces a smoothed output that facilitates the detection of sharp intensity gradients 
across the retina, which, when these intensity gradients co-occur at different scales, correspond 
 
this account of Marr’s computational level. 
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to physically significant boundaries—changes in depth, surface orientation, illumination, or 
reflectance—in the scene. Ullman’s structure-from-motion mechanism succeeds in recovering 
the 3D structure of a moving object by computing the unique rigid configuration consistent 
with three distinct views of four non-coplanar points on the object only because, in our world, 
most objects are rigid in translation (the rigidity assumption). Thus, to yield an explanation of the 
target cognitive capacity, the environment-neutral, domain-general characterization given by the 
computational description must be supplemented by environment-specific facts that explain how 
computing the value of the specified mathematical function, in the subject’s normal environment, 
contributes to the exercise of the target cognitive capacity. 
 Neander wants to find an explanatory role for normal-proper function in computational 
theorizing, but it is not at all clear that there is such. It is, however, possible to recover a notion 
of normal-proper function from a computational account of a cognitive capacity. On the 
plausible assumption that perceptual mechanisms are adaptations, detecting edges in the scene is 
likely to be what the Laplacian/Gaussian mechanism was selected for and so is likely to be the 
normal-proper function of the mechanism. But adaptationist assumptions play no role in 
computational theorizing itself, which takes no account of historical origins. In any event, it does 
not depend on or presuppose the notion on normal-proper function, as P3 requires. 
 Of course, ultimately the results of computational neuroscience and neurophysiology will 
have to be integrated – both theorists are engaged in explaining how the brain works – but it does 
not follow that notions of function essential to physiology (and biology more generally) play a 
central role in computational neuroscience. Moreover, it does not suffice for P3 that a 
computational model presupposes some notion of normal functioning. Computational theorists 
aim to explain manifest cognitive capacities, and, as noted above, they do so by positing 
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mathematical capacities. In attributing a mathematical capacity or competence to a physical 
system – to compute vector displacement, or a smoothing function – a computational model 
supports attributions of correctness and mistake. Just as the normal functioning of the system—
correctly computing the specified mathematical function—explains the subject’s success at a 
cognitive task in its normal environment, so a malfunction explains its occasional failure.  
 The notion of normal functioning central to computational theorizing arises in a 
distinctive way. A complete computational characterization of a physical system will specify a 
mapping from physical states of the system to the arguments and values of the computed 
(mathematical) function. The mapping interprets physical state transitions as computations. For 
ease of explication, let us suppose that the system under consideration is an adder. The mapping 
specifies that when the system goes into the physical state interpreted under the mapping as 57 
and goes into the physical state interpreted under the mapping as 43, then it will go into the 
physical state interpreted under the mapping as 100. In doing so it (correctly) computes the sum 
of 57 and 43. If instead it were to go into the physical state interpreted under the mapping as 99 it 
would miscompute or make a mistake. In some circumstances – if, say, the system suffers severe 
damage – it may go into a physical state not interpreted under the mapping at all, and we can say 
in this case that it doesn’t miscompute, it simply malfunctions. (A miscomputation may be seen 
as a special kind of malfunction. It is also, as all mistakes are, a partial exercise of a 
competence.) So the specification of the function computed (here, addition) and the 
interpretation (here, the mapping of physical states to addends and sums) provides all we need to 
partition the behavioral space into (i) correct computations, (ii) miscalculations or mistakes, and 
(iii) malfunctions (states that receive no interpretation under the mapping). The specification of 
the function computed and the interpretation together provide the norm necessary to underwrite 
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this three-fold distinction. Since a computational model is committed to the existence of a 
mapping of this sort, the model supports talk of ‘well-functioning’ even if (as is usually the case 
with natural computers) the mapping is not fully specified. Importantly, the norm is not grounded 
in the selection history of the organism or other historical facts.  
 In summary, the computational characterization does not make essential appeal to the 
notion of normal-proper function, as required by P3. As noted above, the notion can be 
recovered from a well-confirmed computational model of a cognitive capacity. A computational 
characterization will allow us to say that a system is for adding, or for detecting edges or for 
grasping objects in view, but the notion doesn’t play an essential role in the theorizing. 
 To return to the methodological argument, Premise 5 says that the relevant notion of 
“information” in information-processing accounts is akin to Grice’s “natural meaning”; it is 
factive. If smoke means fire (in this sense) then if there is smoke there must be fire. Natural-
factive information is not semantically evaluable; it is not content. 
 Premise 6 says that cognitive science (in particular, information-processing or 
computational accounts) posits “normative aboutness”, which is a semantically evaluable notion. 
Natural-factive information gets its normative boost, Neander claims, from the normal-proper 
functions of the items that carry it in cognitive systems. But I have argued that the notion of 
normal-proper function plays no role in the branches of cognitive science that treat cognition as 
information-processing. The norms that ground the distinction between well-functioning and 
malfunctioning in computational cognitive science are not the norms central to biology and 
physiology; rather they are grounded in the interpretation of the physical system as computing a 
well-defined function (in the mathematical sense). These are not teleological norms. Hence the 
explanations provided by computational cognitive science do not support informational 
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teleosemantics, as the conclusion of the methodological argument claims.4  
 
3. A Decisive Victory in the Teleosemantic Toad Wars, but…  
In chapter 5, entitled “Simple Minds”, Neander tackles the disputed case of the frog and fly, first 
discussed in Lettvin et al. (1959). As is well known, frogs snap at small items crossing their 
visual field; often enough, in their natural environment, the item is a fly or other type of edible 
insect. Teleosemanticists argue that the internal state responsible for engaging the frog’s tongue-
snapping behavior represents whatever it has the natural function of detecting, but they disagree 
about what that is. Among the candidate contents are bug, frog food, and small dark moving 
thing, Neander’s preferred content in her 1995 and 2006. Philosophical discussion rarely bothers 
with the empirical facts of the case, presuming that the matter can be settled without adverting to 
them. This chapter, which takes us through the specifics of toad prey-capture (very similar to 
what is known about frogs), supports Neander’s earlier proposal. In fact, the chapter is a triumph 
of careful, detailed argumentation which should, in my opinion, close the books on the in-house 
debate among teleosemanticists. But I shall argue, contrary to what all teleosemanticists assume, 
attention to the details of the theory makes clear that there is no explanatory role for the notion of 
N-P function. 
 In summarizing the account I gloss over much interesting detail. The behavioral facts are 
roughly as follows: Toads typically orient toward prey-like stimuli, in particular, toward “worm-
like” stimuli of constant width and varying length that move parallel to their longest axes. This is 
 
4 The norms implicit in the computational characterization are, in fact, sufficient to support a 
semantically evaluable notion of aboutness, though not a teleosemantic notion. The input states 
of the mechanism represent the arguments and the outputs states the values of the computed 
function. In the example described in the text the system misrepresents the sum of 43 and 57 as 
99. See Egan 2014, 2018 for further discussion of these mathematical contents. 
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the sign signal – the configuration of environmental features – that trigger the response. 
Investigation of the toad’s brain reveals that three kinds of retinal ganglion cells in the optic 
nerve, mediating between the retina and relevant mid-brain structures, respond differentially to 
moving stimuli, though their response patterns do not correspond to the toad’s behavioral 
responses; further processing is required. The optic tectum in the toad’s midbrain plays an 
especially important role. Adjacent retinal ganglion cells respond to adjacent retinal receptors, 
which are sensitive to light reflected from adjacent regions of the visual field, and they project to 
adjacent areas of the tectum. In effect, the optic tectum contains multiple maps of the visual 
field. The activation of a particular class of cells in the tectum – known as “T5-2” cells – produce 
directly, without further processing, the appropriate orienting response and are thought by neuro-
ethologists to correspond most closely to the recognition of prey-like stimuli. As Neander puts it, 
“… this is their candidate for the relevant representation, whose content is debated by 
philosophers.” (108)  
 The activation of T5-2 cells in the optic tectum is the most likely candidate for the 
representational vehicle. For convenience, Neander calls a T5-2 activation a “W” and then goes 
on to consider what the content of W-tokenings might be. There are at least two aspects to the 
content: what a target is represented as and where it is represented to be. T5-2 cells respond to 
stimuli in their specific receptive fields and so represent targets to be at the corresponding 
location in the visual field. Neander considers and decisively rebuts a suggestion in Dretske 1988 
that the content of a representation is the state of affairs with the highest probability, given a 
tokening of the representation-type, arguing that the suggestion would favor a location content 
for Ws much less specific than the discriminative ability of the toad merits. Along similar lines, 
she argues that what Ws represent is a configuration of visible features, in particular, a moving 
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worm-like stimulus. This content ascription best captures what T5-2 cells respond selectively to – 
a particular configuration of visible features that alternative content ascriptions such as prey or 
toad food capture only very loosely or not at all, since if prey or toad food do not present as 
moving worm-like stimuli they will not produce W-tokenings.5 
 In explaining the toad’s prey-recognition capacity, the theorist must (1) isolate the neural 
structures that play the appropriate role in mediating the prey-recognition process (T5-2 cells), 
and (2) specify precisely the conditions of their activation (a moving worm-like stimulus). These 
two tasks might be characterized, informally, in representational terms (but see below): (a), 
corresponding to (1), identifying the structures that serve as the representational vehicle, and (b), 
corresponding to (2), ascertaining their content. To support teleosemantics, the notion of normal 
proper function must play an essential explanatory role in theoretical tasks (1) and (2). To 
support the idea that representation is essential to the account, the characterization of T5-2 cell 
activation as carrying representational content must bear a substantial explanatory burden 
beyond that borne by (1) and (2), which do not advert to representational notions. I take up these 
two points in turn.  
 It is not at all obvious that the notion of normal-proper function plays a substantive role 
in either (1) or (2), though, as before, once the structures have been isolated and their activation 
conditions specified, and with plausible further assumptions about the selection history of the 
mechanism, its normal-proper function can be recovered from the account. In arguing against 
alternative content proposals Neander says:    
 
5 Moving worm-like stimulus is close enough to small dark moving thing to vindicate the earlier 
suggestion in Neander 1995 and 2006.  
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… an information-processing approach to explaining vision is not primarily concerned 
with the rational justification of behavior or with explaining why the visual capacity 
evolved. It is primarily concerned with explaining visual processing. (119) 
This is exactly right, but it should be noted that the explanation of the visual processing 
underlying the toad’s prey-capture capacity does not require appeal to selected functions; it 
requires appeal to the precise causal sensitivities of the cells, and to their role in processing – 
purely synchronic features of the mechanism – whatever the selection history of the mechanism 
might be. Neander points out that T5-2 cells are  
… tuned to respond to some things rather than others…. These pathways were adapted 
by phylogenetic natural selection and calibrated by ontogenetic maturational and learning 
processes to respond to certain specific types of stimuli in certain parts of the visual field. 
(114-115, emphasis in original) 
Again, this is almost certainly right, but it is hard to see, either from Neander’s excellent 
reconstruction of current theory about toad prey-capture, or from consideration of the 
information-processing approach to cognition in general, how these assumptions play a 
substantive role in the theory. Indeed, the normal-proper function of the T5-2 cells cannot be 
determined until after their response profiles have been mapped out, that is, until after the 
cognitive theorist has done the work required by tasks (1) and (2). At that point, the theorist’s job 
– specifying the mechanism underlying the toad’s manifest prey-recognition capacity – is 
essentially done. The account can be used to support further claims about the mechanism’s 
normal-proper function, but Neander, and teleosemanticists in general, have the order of 
explanation backwards. There is no explanatory role for N-P function in the information-
processing account. 
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 I turn briefly to the question of whether the notion of representation is doing any 
essential explanatory work in the account. I do not think it is. Characterizing the neural structures 
that play the appropriate role in mediating the prey-recognition process – that is, T5-2 cells – as 
representations with the content moving worm-like stimuli at location x is, I suggest, just a 
convenient way of describing their response profiles. Neander argues convincingly that 
alternative teleosemantic accounts of the content of the toad’s internal state – as representing bug 
or toad food – find no support from the science, because they are at odds with what it tells us 
about the toad’s actual recognitional capacity.6 They fail to capture the response profiles of T5-2 
cells. But once the cognitive theorist has fully specified the state’s causal role in the process the 
theoretical heavy lifting is done. Talk of the cell’s activation representing its distal stimulus 
conditions (its sign signal) is best construed as a gloss that adds nothing of theoretical 
significance.7 To be sure, characterizing the state in contentful terms supports attributions of 
misrepresentation in cases where, for some reason, the cell is activated by something other than 
a moving worm-like stimulus. I am not denying that there is some motivation for ‘going 
representational’ here. Conceptual thought processes are typically characterized in terms of their 
contents and so ascribing content to the non-conceptual processes described by cognitive 
scientists provides a common way of thinking about the two. Philosophers interested in cognition 
more generally will look for continuity with higher-level intentional thought. But the 
information-processing theorist tasked with explaining non-conceptual capacities has no such 
motivation. Everything she might want to say about toad prey-recognition, for example, can be 
 
6 This is not surprising, since Neander is alone among teleosemanticists in taking careful account 
of the empirical work on anuran prey-recognition. 
7 See Egan 2014, 2018 for the view that representational talk is best construed as a gloss serving 
various pragmatic purposes in computational models. 
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expressed more directly in straightforwardly causal terms.  
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